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Summary

Upon taking office, the Obama Administration faced a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, despite a build-up of U.S. forces there in preceding years, including an expanding militant presence in some areas, increasing numbers of civilian and military deaths, Afghan and international disillusionment with corruption in the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, and the infiltration of Taliban militants from safe havens in Pakistan. Building on assessments completed in the latter days of the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration conducted a "strategic review," the results of which were announced on March 27, 2009. The outcome of the review leaned toward those in the Administration who believe that adding combat troops is less crucial than building governance, although the review did announce an increase of 21,000 U.S. troops by October 2009. The strategy emphasized non-military steps such as increasing the resources devoted to economic development, building Afghan governance primarily at the local level, reforming the Afghan government, expanding and reforming the Afghan security forces, and trying to improve Pakistan's efforts to curb militant activity on its soil. Still, the Administration decided that more innovative counter-insurgency tactics that limit civilian casualties and holds territory cleared of insurgents was needed to promote those goals, and in May 2009, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan, was replaced by Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal. On August 30, 2009, McChrystal submitted his review of the military strategy in Afghanistan, which recommends pursuing a comprehensive counter- insurgency strategy in order to avoid mission failure. In response to an anticipated request by McChrystal for about 40,000 additional U.S. combat forces needed for that strategy, President Obama said on September 20, 2009, he would first decide on whether the United States "has the strategy right" before deciding on "resources," and a series of high level meetings to again review strategy began September 30. The Administration has developed about 50 "metrics" to measure U.S. progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan. U.S. strategy has been complicated by the August 20, 2009, presidential election, which has been marred by widespread fraud allegations. A preliminary count, issued September 16, shows President Hamid Karzai winning re-election, but a lengthy complaints and investigations process could prevent finalization of the results until well into October and potentially reduce Karzai's total to the point where a run-off is required. There is also U.S. frustration over Karzai's reliance on regional faction leaders for support, although some argue that Karzai's approach has prevented, to date, inter-ethnic conflict. Other experts believe that there is substantial progress to build on, including substantial economic development, a new constitution, the first presidential elections in October 2004, and parliamentary elections in September 2005. The parliament has become an arena for formerly armed factions to resolve differences, as well as to pressure Karzai. Of the approximately 65,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan, about 53,000 are part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that operates throughout Afghanistan, and the remainder are under the separate U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom. U.S. and partner forces also run 26 regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are expanding an Afghan National Army and reforming an Afghan National Police force--the two combined now total about 175,000. The United States has provided about $40 billion in assistance to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, of which about $18 billion was to equip and train these Afghan forces. Breakdowns are shown in the tables at the end. See also CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin; and CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard.

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