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Summary:
Operation Iraqi Freedom accomplished a long-standing U.S. objective, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, but replacing his regime with a stable, moderate, democratic political structure has been complicated by a persistent Sunni Arab-led insurgency. The Bush Administration asserts that establishing democracy in Iraq will catalyze the promotion of democracy throughout the Middle East and would also likely prevent Iraq from becoming a sanctuary or incubator for terrorists, a key recommendation of the July 2004 report of the 9/11 Commission. The Bush Administration asserts that U.S. policy in Iraq is now showing substantial success, demonstrated by January 30, 2005, elections that chose a National Assembly, and progress in building Iraq's various security forces. The Administration says it expects that the current transition roadmap -- including votes on a permanent constitution by October 31, 2005, and for a permanent government by December 15, 2005 -- will be implemented. The Administration believes that it has largely healed a rift with some European countries over the decision to invade Iraq, and it points to NATO and other nations' contributions of training for Iraqi security forces and government personnel. The Administration has been working with the new Iraqi government to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure; Sunnis were dominant during the regime of Saddam Hussein and now feel marginalized by the newly dominant Shiite Arabs and Kurds. Sunni Arabs form the core of the insurgency. Others believe the U.S. mission in Iraq could fail unless major new policy initiatives are undertaken. Some believe that U.S. counter-insurgent operations are hampered by too small a troop commitment. Others believe that the U.S. presence is driving much of the insurgent challenge and that a U.S. move toward withdrawal might undercut popular support for the insurgency without undermining U.S. security. A further complication to U.S. policy is the recent or imminent withdrawal of sizeable allied troop commitments, although many nations are compensating for their withdrawals with new pledges of financial aid or trainers of Iraqi security forces and government officials. This report will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Elections and New Government, CRS Report RS22079, the Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq; CRS Report RL32105, Foreign Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction; and CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction Assistance.
