Download Locations:
Summary:
Chemical facilities might be vulnerable to direct attacks by terrorists or covert use of business contacts, facilities, and materials to gain access to potentially dangerous chemicals. Because few terrorist attacks have been attempted on U.S. chemical facilities, the estimated risk of death and injury in the near future is low, relative to the likelihood of accidents or attacks on other targets using conventional weapons. For any individual chemical plant, the risk is very small, but risks may be increasing, consequences for human health and the environment could be severe, and available evidence indicates that many facilities may lack adequate safeguards.
The federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act and Clean Air Act require planning to protect the general public from accidental releases of hazardous chemicals from chemical facilities. The Acts mandate disclosure of chemical hazards in order to stimulate public interest in planning. Since neither law addresses releases due to terrorism, EPA authority to regulate in this area is unclear.
Congress might rely on existing mechanisms in the public and private sectors to evaluate and improve chemical site security, while waiting for better information about the potential harm from terrorist attacks on chemical facilities. Oversight of EPA implementation of existing planning requirements also is an option. Or, Congress might enact legislation to reduce risks in several ways. The most common approach is to ÒhardenÓ defenses, for example by increasing security patrols. Hardening tactics may be adapted to security needs, layered to deepen protection, and often are relatively low cost. A potential disadvantage is that even the most effective security measures might be defeated by a determined, skilled terrorist organization. Risk also might be reduced by use of safer chemicals, procedures, and processes. This strategy might reduce harm from accidents as well as attacks, but may involve higher costs. Restricting terroristsÕ access to information might be the least costly option, but would limit public access and reduce accountability of facility owners.
Policy makers face at least three key issues: the effect of public disclosure; the relative importance of diverse risks; and who should be responsible for achieving results. Various legislative proposals in the 107th Congress (S. 1456, S. 1602/H.R. 5300, S. 2452, S. 2579, H.R. 2435, and H.R. 4698) would have required owners to reduce the hazards at chemical facilities and restricted access to hazardous chemicals or to information about chemical facilities. Public Law 107-296, establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), does not address chemical plant security directly. However, if facilities are part of the Òcritical infrastructureÓ (e.g., water utilities), the law requires DHS to analyze vulnerabilities and recommend ways to enhance site security. Information voluntarily submitted to DHS about facility vulnerability is exempt from public disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act and state or local laws. In the 108th Congress, S. 6 and S. 157 would direct EPA to oversee chemical facilities, in consultation with DHS. They would require high priority facilities to identify hazards, assess vulnerabilities, and develop and implement plans to reduce the consequences of terrorist attacks.
This report will be updated as warranted by congressional activity.
