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Summary

President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of previous Administrations to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence. The Administration has not changed the previous Administration's characterization of Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests," a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Obama Administration formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor--in particular through expanded direct diplomatic engagement with Iran and, prior to Iran's disputed June 12, 2009, presidential elections, put this outreach into practice with messages to the Iranian people by President Obama, and through invitations to and contact with Iranian diplomats at multilateral meetings. Attempting to convince Iran that the Administration is not hostile to Iran, the Administration also downplayed Bush Administration policies to add international sanctions on Iran, to fund civil society activists there, and to openly discuss potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. The Administration's Iran policy has evolved somewhat because of the Iranian crackdown against protesters who alleged vast fraud in the June 12, 2009, presidential election, in which incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner. The unrest has represented the most serious challenge, to date, to the regime's authority, although Iran's Supreme Leader appears to be succeeding in quelling the public outcry and intra-regime tension as of September 2009. President Obama has continued to back engagement with Iran, in part by agreeing to U.S. attendance at an October 1, 2009, multilateral meeting with Iran. That meeting resulted in an agreement for the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect a newly revealed Iranian facility, and a tentative deal for Russia and France to process some of Iran's low-enriched uranium for medical use. If made a permanent program, this concept might possibly represent a longer-term solution to international concerns about Iran's nuclear program. The agreements might have represented an Iranian reaction to growing partner country support for additional economic sanctions against Iran if the talks do not bear fruit. Any additional U.N. sanctions would build on those put in place since 2006. The U.N. sanctions ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran; freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear entities and personalities; prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran; ban international travel by some Iranians; call for inspections of some Iranian sea and airborne cargo shipments; and call for restrictions on dealings with some Iranian banks. Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, are intended to weaken Iran's economy and compound the U.N. pressure. Some in Congress believe that additional unilateral U.S. sanctions--reflected in bills in the 111th Congress such as H.R. 2194 and S. 908, which would tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran by penalizing sales to Iran of gasoline--could help pressure Iran into a nuclear settlement. Others believe new U.S. unilateral or U.N. sanctions would cause Iran to dig in its heels and resist compromise, and the Obama Administration and its partners have not withdrawn previous offers of economic and political incentives for Iran if it were to agree to a nuclear settlement acceptable to the international community. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions , by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report RS22323, Iran's Activities and Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report RL34544, Iran's Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr.

Related Legislation:
• H.R.2194
• S.908
• S.2087
• S.2232

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