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Summary

President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence. The Administration has not changed the previous Administration's characterization of Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests," a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor--in particular through expanded direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. Prior to Iran's disputed June 12, 2009 presidential elections, this U.S. outreach was put into practice with messages to the Iranian people by President Obama, and through invitations to and contact with Iranian diplomats at multilateral meetings. Attempting to convince Iran that the Administration is not hostile to Iran, the Administration also downplayed Bush Administration policies to add international sanctions on Iran, to fund civil society activists there, and to openly discuss potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. The Administration's Iran policy did not change significantly because of the Iranian crackdown against protesters who alleged vast fraud in the June 12, 2009 presidential election, in which incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner. The unrest has represented the most serious challenge, to date, to the regime's authority, although Iran's Supreme Leader appears to be succeeding in quelling the public outcry and intra-regime tension as of September 2009. President Obama has criticized Iran's use of violence against protesters, but the President apparently has sided with those in the Administration who want to take advantage of Iran's internal weakness to obtain a compromise that curbs Iran's nuclear program. The Administration has indicated that, if Iran refuses to return to the nuclear bargaining table by September 24, 2009 in earnest, it would return to working with allies to resume sanctioning and pressuring Iran. Those threats may have contributed to Iran's announcement in early September 2009 that it is ready to return to the multilateral talks. Some in Congress believe that bills in the 111th Congress, such as H.R. 2194 and S. 908, which would tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran by penalizing sales to Iran of gasoline, could help pressure Iran into a nuclear settlement. Others believe new U.S. unilateral sanctions would cause Iran to dig in its heels and resist compromise. The multilateral process on Iran's nuclear program remains as it has been since 2006 Πattempting to persuade Iran to limit its nuclear program by applying progressive multilateral economic pressure on Iran while also offering it potential cooperation should it suspend its enrichment of uranium. The pressure has taken the form of U.N. Security Council resolutions that ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran; freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear entities and personalities; prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran; ban international travel by some Iranians; call for inspections of some Iranian sea and airborne cargo shipments; and call for restrictions on dealings with some Iranian banks. Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, are intended to weaken Iran's economy and compound the U.N. pressure. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions , by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report RS22323, Iran's Activities and Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman, and CRS Report RL34544, Iran's Nuclear Program: Status, by Paul K. Kerr.

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