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Summary:
On July 22, 2004 the 9/11 Commission released its final report. The report calls
for changes to be made by the executive branch and Congress to more effectively
protect our nation in an age of modern terrorism and provides forty-one concrete
recommendations.
This paper addresses the components of the Administration's 2003 National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the potential impact, if any, of key
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission on the strategy.
Generally, the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission as they relate to
strategy content and implementation appear consistent with, and supportive of, the
National Strategy. Few question the 9/11 Commission Report's overarching premise
that U.S. counter-terrorism structure, strategy, and implementation can be improved.
Some, however, see certain Commission recommendations as incomplete, if not
flawed. They suggest that the Commission is often focused on the "last war" and not
a future one and suggest that the Commission consciously avoids tackling some of
the more complex, yet pressing issues. For example, the Commission, as its first
recommendation, stresses the need for identifying and prioritizing terrorist
sanctuaries with a focus on failed states. Some assert, however, that terrorists are
increasingly returning to their politically stable home countries for sanctuary where
they blend into local communities, where their training camps are in civilian housing
complexes, and where their bomb factories are in private residences. Although a
number of the Commission's recommendations fall within the category of preventing
the growth of Islamic extremism, none addresses directly the issue of confronting
incitement to terrorism when promoted, countenanced, or facilitated by the action
- or inaction - of nation states.
Also at issue is the pace at which refinement, or restructuring, of the intelligence
community should proceed at a time when the nation perceives itself at war with
terror. Some question to what degree major organizational changes might reduce
operational efficiency in the short term and how this compares to any long-term
benefits inherent in more dramatic reform.
With terrorists able to change targets, tactics, and weapons on short notice,
many argue that a successful counterterrorism strategy and institutional structures
will need similar flexibility. The degree to which such flexibility will be built into
strategy, and into any new institutional structures recommend by the 9/11
Commission, is yet to be determined.
This report will not be updated.
