http://opencrs.cdt.org Recent Congressional Research Service reports and issue briefs from the Open CRS database en http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34475 Legislation that would repeal or otherwise provide for a summer-long moratorium of federal transportation fuel taxes has been introduced in the 110th Congress. Simultaneously, Senators McCain and Clinton are proposing a summer fuel tax collection moratorium as part of their Presidential campaigns. Fuel prices have risen rapidly in 2008 for a variety of reasons. Those seeking to alter federal fuel tax collection are doing so in the belief that a reduction in fuel taxes would give Americans a modest level of economic relief from high pump prices. Current market conditions and the marginal amount of tax relief incorporated in most proposals, however, raise uncertainty as to whether prices to individuals and businesses would fall and whether any price decline would be meaningful to consumers in economic terms. Also of concern is the possible impact of any repeal or moratorium on the overall federal budget deficit. A reduction in transportation fuel taxes would result in a decrease in spending for Highway Trust Fund-supported federal programs, unless Congress designated alternate sources of funding for these programs. As a result of the structure of the federal programs, the effects of a fuel tax repeal on federal transportation programs would not necessarily be immediate, but depending on the length and scope of the repeal or suspension, they could be substantial. Wed, 07 May 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34475 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34474 Prices for nearly all major U.S. agricultural program crops -- corn, barley, sorghum, oats, wheat, rice, and soybeans -- have exhibited extreme price volatility since mid-2007, while rising to record or near-record levels in early 2008. Several international organizations have announced that the sharply rising commodity prices are likely to have dire consequences for the world's vulnerable populations, particularly in import-dependent, less developed nations. In the United States, high commodity prices have pushed farm income to successive annual records and have sharply lowered government farm program costs, but they have also stoked the flames of food price inflation and have raised costs for livestock producers and food processors. In addition, high, unexpectedly volatile prices have increased the risk and costs associated with grain merchandising. In particular, they have dramatically increased the cost of routine hedging activities (i.e., pricing commodities for purchase, delivery, or use at some future date) at commodity futures exchanges and, as a result, have diminished "forward contracting" opportunities for grain and oilseed producers who are eager to take advantage of record high market prices. For some crops (particularly for wheat and rice), the price increases are likely to be relatively short-term in nature and are due to weather-related crop shortfalls in major producer and consumer countries, a weak U.S. dollar that has helped spark large increases in U.S. exports, a bidding war among major U.S. crops for land in the months leading up to spring planting in 2008, and the often perverse price effects resulting from international policy responses by several major exporting and importing nations to protect their domestic markets. Assuming a return to normal weather, these factors will likely self-correct within two growing seasons as global supplies are replenished and prices moderate. For coarse grains (corn, sorghum, barley, oats, and rye), oilseeds, and oilseed products (e.g., vegetable oil and meal), the price increases have also been due to strong, sustained demand deriving from two sources: robust income growth in developing countries (e.g., China and India), which has contributed to increased demand for meat products and the feed grains needed to produce that meat; and growing agricultural feedstock demand to meet large increases in government biofuel-usage mandates or goals in the United States, the European Union, and other countries. Market analysts, including the United Nations' Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), are predicting record global grain and oilseed production in 2008 in response to the high market prices. However, given the overall strength in demand growth, most market analysts predict that when commodity supplies eventually recover and prices moderate from current high levels, the new equilibrium prices will be significantly higher than has traditionally been observed during periods of market balance. This report examines the causes, consequences, and outlook for prices of the major U.S. program crops, and provides references for more detailed information. It will be updated as events warrant. Tue, 06 May 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34474 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34471 Numerous news stories in the popular print and electronic media have documented suicides among servicemembers and veterans returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In the United States, there are more than 30,000 suicides annually. Suicides among veterans are included in this number, but it is not known in what proportion. There is no nationwide system for surveillance of suicide specifically among veterans. Recent data show that about 20% of suicide deaths nationwide could be among veterans. It is not known what proportion of these deaths are among OIF/OEF veterans. Veterans have a number of risk factors that increase their chance of attempting suicide. These risk factors include combat exposure, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other mental health problems, traumatic brain injury (TBI), poor social support structures, and access to lethal means. Several bills addressing suicide in veterans have been introduced in the 110th Congress. On November 5, 2007, the Joshua Omvig Veterans Suicide Prevention Act (P.L. 110-110) was signed into law, requiring the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to establish a comprehensive program for suicide prevention among veterans. More recently, the Veterans Suicide Study Act (S. 2899) was introduced. This bill would require the VA to conduct a study, and report to Congress, regarding suicides among veterans since 1997. The VA has carried out a number of suicide prevention initiatives, including establishing a national suicide prevention hotline for veterans, conducting awareness events at VA medical centers, and screening and assessing veterans for suicide risk. This report discusses data sources and systems that can provide information about suicides in the general population and among veterans, and known risk and protective factors associated with suicide in each group. It also discusses suicide prevention efforts by the VA. It does not discuss Department of Defense (DOD) activities, or VA's treatment of risk factors for suicide, such as depression, PTSD, and substance abuse. This report will be updated when legislative activity warrants. Mon, 05 May 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34471 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33341 Congress authorized the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA, P.L. 94-163) to help prevent a repetition of the economic dislocation caused by the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo. The program is managed by the Department of Energy (DOE). Physically, the SPR comprises five underground storage facilities, hollowed out from naturally occurring salt domes in Texas and Louisiana. The SPR could be drawn down initially at a rate of 4.3 million barrels per day (mbd) for up to 90 days; thereafter, the rate would begin to decline. The capacity of the SPR was reported to be 727 million barrels in 2005. In addition, a Northeast Heating Oil Reserve (NHOR) holds 2 million barrels of heating oil in above-ground storage. On August 8, 2005, the President signed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). The act permanently authorized the SPR and required, "as expeditiously as practicable," expansion of the SPR to its authorized maximum of 1 billion barrels. Within one year of enactment, the Secretary of Energy is to select sites -- from among those that have been previously studied -- for the expansion. Among other provisions, the Secretary is also required to develop procedures for achieving the fill objective without "incurring excessive cost" or placing upward pressure on prices. EPCA authorizes drawdown of the Reserve upon a finding by the President that there is a "severe energy supply interruption." This is deemed by the statute to exist if three conditions are joined: If "(a) an emergency situation exists and there is a significant reduction in supply which is of significant scope and duration; (b) a severe increase in the price of petroleum products has resulted from such emergency situation; and (c) such price increase is likely to cause a major adverse impact on the national economy." Congress enacted additional drawdown authority in 1990 (Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments of 1990, P.L. 101-383), permitting the President to use the SPR for a short period without having to declare the existence of a "severe energy supply interruption" or the need to meet obligations of the United States under the international energy program overseen by the International Energy Agency (IEA). In addition, P.L. 94-163 provided authority for exchanges of SPR oil where oil is loaned and then returned with additional oil as a premium. There are differences of opinion as to what should be termed a "severe energy supply interruption." A spike in crude and product prices often stirs calls for use of the SPR. However, the SPR is intended by statute to ameliorate discernible physical shortages of crude oil. The sharp rise in prices following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 was not a response to any shortage of crude, but to shortages of products owing to the shutdown of major refining capacity in the United States and an interruption of product transportation systems. Demand growth that has strapped refinery capacity has, at other times, quite divorced product prices from crude supply, a departure from the past. It has complicated reconciling developments in markets with possible use of the SPR. This report will be updated as events warrant. Fri, 02 May 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33341 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34467 Mergers, airline bankruptcies, aircraft safety and maintenance concerns, extensive flight delays and cancellations, $100-plus-per-barrel oil prices, and a litany of other issues define congressional interest in the airline industry at present. Congress does not play a day-to-day role in any of these issues. Most ongoing oversight of the industry, to the extent that it does occur, takes place within the executive branch. Congress periodically addresses airline issues through legislation, but for the most part the congressional role occurs primarily through oversight. The authority to approve or disapprove airline mergers rests entirely with the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) makes recommendations to DOJ based on its evaluation of the effect of a proposed merger on airline industry competition. Congress has no specific statutory role in the airline merger review and approval process, having legislatively charged the executive branch with that task. Members of Congress can, and do, file statements with DOJ expressing their views on a proposed merger. Congressional interest going forward is likely to focus on the proposed merger between Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines. Recent incidents, including passengers being held in aircraft for eight or more hours awaiting takeoff, passengers being stranded by the shutdown of bankrupt air carriers, as well as deteriorating airline on-time arrival performance, have led to increasing congressional interest in airline passenger consumer issues. Currently, most passenger rights are set forth in the airlines' "contract of carriage" language. Existing law does, however, provide procedures and compensation rules for "bumping" and lost or damaged baggage. The main power the Department of Transportation (DOT) has to protect consumers is the department's power to take action against air carriers for "deceptive trade practices." Despite impressive airline safety statistics in recent years, some aviation safety professionals and some Members of Congress have expressed concern that the industry and regulators have been lulled into complacency with regard to safety. This concern has been heightened recently in response to various findings that airlines have failed to fully comply with aircraft inspections and repairs mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Congressional oversight has focused on the relationship between the FAA and the airlines and the manner in which the FAA carries out its safety mandates. This report provides an overview of selected airline related issues currently subject to congressional oversight and/or possible legislation. Many of the issues discussed here are also addressed in some fashion as part of the ongoing congressional debate about reauthorization of the FAA. Those seeking additional information on reauthorization should refer to CRS Report RL33920, Federal Aviation Administration Reauthorization: An Overview of Selected Provisions in Proposed Legislation. This report will be updated as warranted by events. Wed, 30 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34467 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34468 Over the last decade, there has been a growing U.S. trade deficit in fresh and processed fruits and vegetables. Although U.S. fruit and vegetable exports totaled nearly $9 billion in 2007, U.S. imports of fruits and vegetables were more than $16 billion, resulting in a gap between imports and exports of more than $7 billion. This trade deficit has widened over time -- despite the fact that U.S. fruit and vegetable exports have continued to rise each year -- because growth in imports has greatly outpaced export growth. As a result, the United States has gone from being a net exporter of fresh and processed fruits and vegetables in the early 1970s to being a net importer of fruits and vegetables today. A number of factors are shaping current competitive market conditions worldwide and global trade in fruits and vegetables in particular, which explain in part the rising fruit and vegetable trade deficit. These include: Wed, 30 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34468 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22865 The Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, P.L. 97-219, created Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programs within the major federal research and development (R&D) agencies. This effort was intended to increase participation of small innovative companies in federally funded R&D. Government agencies with extramural R&D budgets of $100 million or more are required to set aside a portion of these funds to support research and development in small businesses through the SBIR program. The original act has been extended several times and is currently scheduled to terminate on September 30, 2008. A bill to reauthorize and amend the program, H.R. 5819, passed the House on April 23, 2008. Tue, 29 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22865 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34460 This report examines recent proposals that would create a new temporary extension of unemployment compensation. The recent proposals to temporarily extend the duration of Unemployment Compensation (UC) include the proposal in the Senate Committee on Finance Report of the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 dated January 30, 2008, H.R. 4934, S. 2544, H.R. 5688, and H.R. 5749. Only sections in the proposals that relate to the extension of unemployment benefits are detailed. Thus, only portions of H.R. 4934 (Title I-Emergency Unemployment Compensation and Title II-Increased Unemployment Benefits) and the Senate Committee on Finance proposal (Title I-Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation) that directly relate to extending the duration of unemployment benefits are included. Matters concerning fraud and overpayments are not discussed. Thu, 24 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34460 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22861 As households become more reliant on 401(k) plans for retirement income, policymakers have become more concerned that participants are unaware of the fees charged in their 401(k) plans. Small differences in fees charged can have large impacts on 401(k) account balances upon retirement. This report provides information on the kinds of fees that are charged in 401(k) plans and details the provisions of H.R. 3185, the 401(k) Fair Disclosure for Retirement Security Act as introduced on July 14, 2007. was passed by the Committee on Education and Labor by a vote of 25-19 on April 16, 2008. It will updated to reflect other 401(k) fee disclosure legislation. Thu, 24 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22861 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22864 This report provides data from the past two decades on the size of the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS's) workforce, the number of persons employed by USPS by employment categories, and the number of persons employed by USPS under timelimited contracts. It also analyzes the most salient aspects of these employment data. USPS employs nearly 786,000 persons. Although USPS's workforce size has changed relatively little from 20 years ago, it has dropped 12% in the past decade. The number of career employees declined 8.8% since 1987; however, the number of non-career employees increased 106.5%. Clerks, who staff retail counters at post offices and manually sort mail, dropped more than 31% since 1987. Rural mail delivery carriers, in contrast, grew 84.9%; and building and equipment maintenance personnel and vehicle maintenance personnel grew 28.7% and 14.9%, respectively. This report will be updated at the beginning of each new Congress. Tue, 22 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22864 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34456 A presidential transition is a unique time in America and holds the promise of opportunity, as well as a possible risk to the nation's security interests. The 20082009 election marks the first presidential transition in the post-9/11 era, and is of concern to many national security observers. While changes in administration during U.S. involvement in national security related activities are not unique to the 20082009 election, many observers suggest that the current security climate and recent acts of terrorism by individuals wishing to influence national elections and change foreign policies portend a time of increased risk to the current presidential transition period. Whether the enemies of the United States choose to undertake action that may harm the nation's security interests during the 2008-2009 election, or the new President experiences a relatively peaceful period during the transition, many foreign and domestic policy and security challenges will await the new Administration. How the new President recognizes and responds to these challenges will depend heavily on the planning and learning that occurs prior to the inauguration. Actions can be taken by the outgoing President and President-elect that may ameliorate decisionmaking activities in the new administration. Whether an incident of national security significance occurs just before or soon after the presidential transition, the actions or inactions of the outgoing Administration may have a long-lasting effect on the new President's ability to effectively safeguard U.S. interests and may affect the legacy of the outgoing President. This report discusses historical national-security related presidential transition activities, provides a representative sampling of national security issues the next administration may encounter, and offers considerations and options relevant to each of the five phases of the presidential transition period. Each phase has distinct challenges and opportunities for the incoming administration, the outgoing administration, and Congress. This report will be updated as needed. Mon, 21 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34456 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34455 A growing community of interest, including Members of Congress, senior officials in the executive branch, and think-tank analysts, is calling for a reexamination of how well the U.S. government, including both the executive branch and Congress, is organized to apply all instruments of national power to national security activities. The organizations and procedures used today to formulate strategy, support presidential decision-making, plan and execute missions, and budget for those activities are based on a framework established just after World War II. That framework was designed to address a very different global strategic context: a bipolar world with a single peer competitor state, the Soviet Union, which was driven by an expansionist ideology and backed by a massive military force. Six decades later, in the wake of 9/11, many observers and practitioners note, the United States faces greater uncertainty and a broader array of security challenges than before, including non-state as well as traditional state-based threats, and transnational challenges such as organized crime, energy security concerns, cyber attacks, and epidemic disease. The "outdated bureaucratic superstructure" of the 20th century is an inadequate basis for protecting the nation from 21st century security challenges, critics contend, and the system itself, or alternatively, some of its key components, requires revision. Doubts about the adequacy of the system to meet 21st century security challenges have been catalyzed by recent operational experiences, including Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and responses to Hurricane Katrina. In the view of many defense and foreign affairs analysts, these operations revealed deep flaws in the ability of the U.S. government to make timely decisions, to develop prioritized strategies and integrated plans, to resource those efforts, and to effectively coordinate and execute complex missions. Such shortcomings, some argue, have had a deleterious impact on the success of those missions and on the reputation of the United States as a reliable partner. Should these "national security reform" debates continue to gain momentum, Congress could choose to weigh in by holding hearings to clarify identified problems and to consider the advantages and risks of proposed solutions; by developing legislation ranging from a new National Security Act to specific changes in executive branch organization, authorities, or resourcing; or by considering adjustments in Congress's own arrangements for providing holistic oversight of national security issues. The purpose of this report, which will be updated as events warrant, is to help frame the emerging debates by taking note of the leading advocates for change, highlighting identified shortcomings in key elements of the current system, and describing categories of emerging proposals for change. Fri, 18 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34455 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22863 The President is generally seen as exercising broad discretionary authority over developing and implementing U.S. direct investment policy, including the authority to suspend or block investments that "threaten to impair the national security." Congress is also directly involved in formulating the scope and direction of U.S. foreign investment policy and some Members are urging the President to be more aggressive in blocking certain types of foreign investments. Such confrontations reflect vastly different philosophical and political views between members of Congress and between Congress and the Administration over the role foreign investment plays in the economy and the role that economic activities should play in the context of U.S. national security policy. In July 2007, Congress asserted its own role in making and conducting foreign investment policy when it adopted and the President signed P.L. 110-49, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007. This law broadens Congress' oversight role and it explicitly includes the areas of homeland security and critical infrastructure as separately identifiable components of national security that the President must consider when evaluating the national security implications of a foreign investment transaction. The act may well draw Congress into a greater dialogue, and possibly greater conflict, with the Administration over efforts to define the limits of the broad rubric of national economic security. This report will be updated as warranted by events. Thu, 17 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22863 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33153 Concern has grown in Congress and elsewhere about China's military modernization. The topic is an increasing factor in discussions over future required U.S. Navy capabilities. The issue for Congress addressed in this report is: How should China's military modernization be factored into decisions about U.S. Navy programs? Several elements of China's military modernization have potential implications for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. These include theater-range ballistic missiles (TBMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, naval mines, nuclear weapons, and possibly highpower microwave (HPM) devices. China's naval limitations or weaknesses include capabilities for operating in waters more distant from China, joint operations, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), long-range surveillance and targeting systems, anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and logistics. Observers believe a near-term focus of China's military modernization is to field a force that can succeed in a short-duration conflict with Taiwan and act as an antiaccess force to deter U.S. intervention or delay the arrival of U.S. forces, particularly naval and air forces, in such a conflict. Some analysts speculate that China may attain (or believe that it has attained) a capable maritime anti-access force, or elements of it, by about 2010. Other observers believe this will happen later. Potential broader or longer-term goals of China's naval modernization include asserting China's regional military leadership and protecting China's maritime territorial, economic, and energy interests. China's naval modernization has potential implications for required U.S. Navy capabilities in terms of preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area, maintaining U.S. Navy presence and military influence in the Western Pacific, and countering Chinese ballistic missile submarines. Preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area could place a premium on the following: on-station or early-arriving Navy forces, capabilities for defeating China's maritime anti-access forces, and capabilities for operating in an environment that could be characterized by information warfare and possibly electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and the use of nuclear weapons. Certain options are available for improving U.S. Navy capabilities by 2010; additional options, particularly in shipbuilding, can improve U.S. Navy capabilities in subsequent years. China's naval modernization raises potential issues for Congress concerning the role of China in Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy planning; the size of the Navy; the Pacific Fleet's share of the Navy; forward homeporting of Navy ships in the Western Pacific; the number of aircraft carriers, submarines, and ASW-capable platforms; Navy missile defense, air-warfare, AAW, ASW, and mine warfare programs; Navy computer network security; and EMP hardening of Navy systems. This report will be updated as events warrant. Wed, 16 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL33153 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22862 How to address safety, health, and environmental risks from potential exposure to abandoned or discarded military munitions has been a long-standing issue. There has been particular concern among the public about such risks at older decommissioned military properties that have been in civilian use for many years, and at closed military bases still awaiting redevelopment. Many of these properties contain former training ranges and munitions disposal sites where the extent of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and related environmental contamination is not fully understood. The approval of another round of military base closings in 2005 raised additional concerns about munitions risks on certain bases, and whether cleanup challenges may limit their civilian reuse. This report discusses the potential hazards of military munitions and related contamination, the authorities of the Department of Defense (DOD) to address these hazards, the status and costs of cleanup efforts, and issues for Congress. Wed, 16 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RS22862 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34451 During its first session, the 110th Congress provided emergency appropriations of $86.8 billion for the Department of Defense and $2.4 billion for international affairs, mainly for activities related to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Of those amounts, $70 billion for defense and all of the $2.4 billion for international affairs were provided in the FY2008 consolidated appropriations bill, H.R. 2764, which the President signed into law, P.L. 110-161, on December 26, 2007. Congress left unresolved, however, the status of a substantial amount of additional FY2008 emergency funding that the Administration had requested. In all, Congress did not act on about $102.5 billion requested for the Department of Defense and $5.4 billion for international affairs. Congressional leaders have said that they plan to bring up a bill providing additional supplemental appropriations for FY2008 sometime this spring. Now, the House Appropriations Committee plans to begin marking up a supplemental bill the week of April 21. The bill may include some or all of the remaining amounts the Administration has requested for defense and international affairs and also funding for additional domestic as well as defense and international programs. The bill may become a vehicle for a renewed debate about troop withdrawals from Iraq. Other issues may include whether to provide reconstruction assistance to Iraq as loans rather than grants and whether to require that military units be stationed at home for at least as long as they are deployed abroad. There may also be debate about unrequested funding for C-17, C-130, and F-22 aircraft, and perhaps for some other programs, that Congress may consider adding to the bill. It is also possible that the supplemental could become a vehicle for an economic stimulus package, including extended unemployment benefits and other measures. This CRS report will be updated regularly to report on congressional action on remaining supplemental appropriations. For congressional action on FY2008 supplemental funding provided through December 2007, see CRS Report RL34278, FY2008 Supplemental Appropriations for Global War on Terror Military Operations, International Affairs, and Other Purposes, which will not be updated further. Tue, 15 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34451 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34452 Federal student loans are made available under two major loan programs authorized under the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965, as amended: the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program, authorized by Title IV, Part B, of the HEA; and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program, authorized by Title IV, Part D, of the HEA. Under the FFEL program, private lenders make loans and the federal government guarantees lenders against loss due to borrower default, death, permanent disability, or, in limited instances, bankruptcy. Under the DL program, the federal government lends directly to students and their families, using federal capital (i.e., funds from the U.S. Treasury). The FFEL program is the successor program to the guaranteed student loan (GSL) program, originally enacted under Title IV, Part B, of the HEA. It is the older and larger of the two major federal student loan programs. Approximately four-fifths of non-Consolidation loans are made under the FFEL program, while approximately one-fifth are made under the DL program. During the past several months, a large number of FFEL program lenders have curtailed or ceased their participation in the FFEL program, citing reasons that include difficulties in raising capital through the securitization of student loan debt and reductions in lender subsidies enacted under the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 (CCRAA). Concerns have been raised that if lender participation in the FFEL program decreases substantially or if a substantial portion of lenders cease lending to students who attend certain institutions of higher education (IHEs), large numbers of students may face difficulty in obtaining FFEL program loans. In addition, concerns have been raised about access to borrowing opportunities for students who have come to rely on private (non-federal) student loans because they have exhausted their eligibility for federal student loans. Issues concerning federal student loans have been active during the 110th Congress. On October 27, 2007, the CCRAA was enacted, which made numerous changes to the federal student loan programs. Also in the 110th Congress, the House and the Senate have passed bills, H.R. 4137 and S. 1642, respectively, to amend and extend the HEA. On April 10, 2008, the House Committee on Education and Labor marked up H.R. 5715, the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008. This closely followed the introduction of S. 2815, the Strengthening Student Aid for All Act, in the Senate on April 3, 2008. This report examines proposals in H.R. 5715 and S. 2815 to amend the federal student loan programs. It will be updated to reflect legislative developments. Tue, 15 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34452 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34444 Aliens may be removed from the United States for a variety of reasons, such as entering into the country unlawfully, overstaying a visa, or committing a crime. Prior to removal, however, aliens usually have access to a removal hearing or some other form of adjudication that determines whether an alien is subject to removal. Although judicial review by a federal court of appeals of a removal order is generally available, Congress has denied the federal courts jurisdiction to review many types of removals, such as expedited removal orders, crime-related removals, discretionary determinations, and matters involving prosecutorial discretion. Jurisdictional issues related to removal are further complicated because of the constitutional requirement that some adequate substitute for habeas corpus be available for all removal orders. In order to satisfy this requirement, Congress specifically preserved the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to review constitutional claims and questions of law for all removals, even those arising from an area where judicial review is generally barred. This report shall attempt to wend a way through the jurisdictional thicket created by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by focusing on the procedural mechanisms used to initiate judicial review and the reach of an Article III court's jurisdiction to review a removal order. Discussion concerning the procedures underlying removal hearings and administrative review is limited to their relation to judicial review and will not be expatiated. Mon, 14 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34444 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34447 Churches and other houses of worship qualify for tax-exempt status as Internal Revenue Code ? 501(c)(3) organizations. One qualification for ? 501(c)(3) status is that these organizations may not participate in political campaign activity. They are permitted under the tax laws to engage in other political activities (e.g., distribute voter guides and invite candidates to speak at church functions) so long as such activity does not support or oppose a candidate. Additionally, church leaders may engage in campaign activity in their capacity as private individuals without negative tax consequences to the church. The tax code's political campaign prohibition is sometimes referred to as the "Johnson Amendment," after then-Senator Lyndon Johnson, who introduced the provision as an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1954. While some have argued the prohibition violates churches' free exercise and free speech rights under the First Amendment, the two federal courts of appeals to address the issue have reached the opposite conclusion. Separate from the prohibition in the tax code, the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) may also restrict the ability of churches to engage in electioneering activities. Legislation introduced in the 110th Congress, H.R. 2275, would repeal the political campaign prohibition in the tax code. If this bill were enacted into law, churches could engage in campaign activities without jeopardizing their tax-exempt status, but they would still be subject to applicable campaign finance laws. This report examines the restrictions imposed on campaign activity by churches under tax and campaign finance laws, discusses recent IRS inquiries into such activity, and analyzes H.R. 2275. Mon, 14 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL34447 http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL32109 The Navy in FY2006 and future years wants to procure no more Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers and instead wants to begin procuring two new classes of surface combatants -- a new destroyer called the DD(X), and a smaller surface combatant called the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). In support of this plan, the Navy for FY2005 requested procurement funding for three final DDG-51s and initial procurement funding for the first DD(X) and the first LCS. Congress for FY2005 provided $3,445.0 million for procurement of three DDG51s. Congress also provided $350.5 million in advance procurement funding for the DD(X) program -- $221.1 million for the first DD(X), and $84.4 million for the second DD(X) -- and directed that procurement of DD(X)s be fully funded in the Navy's ship-procurement account rather than incrementally funded in the Navy's research and development account as the Navy had proposed for the first DD(X). Congress approved the Navy's plan to build the first LCS using research and development funds rather than shipbuilding funds, provided $214.7 million in procurement funding to fund the ship's entire construction cost (rather than about half the ship's cost, as the Navy had requested), required the next LCS (to be funded in FY2006) to be built to a second LCS design now being developed, prohibited the Navy from requesting funds in FY2006 to build a third LCS, and required all LCSs built after the lead ships of each design to be funded in the Navy's ship-procurement account rather than its research and development account. As part of the proposed FY2006 defense budget to be submitted to Congress in early February 2005, the Navy is expected to request additional advance procurement funding for the first DD(X) and procurement funding for the second LCS. The DD(X) and LCS programs raise several oversight issues for Congress. Potential options for Congress for the DD(X) program include approving the program as proposed by the Navy and supplementing the industrial base, if needed, with additional work; accelerating procurement of the lead DD(X) to FY2006 and the second DD(X) to FY2007; deferring procurement of the lead DD(X) to FY2008; procuring two or more DD(X)s per year; building DD(X)s at a single yard, or building each DD(X) jointly at two yards; terminating the DD(X) program now, or after procuring a single ship as a technology demonstrator, and supplementing the industrial base with additional work until the start of CG(X) cruiser procurement, and starting design work now on a smaller, less expensive alternative to the DD(X) and procuring this new design, rather than DD(X)s or CG(X)s, starting around FY2011. Options for Congress on the LCS program include shifting procurement funding for LCS mission modules to the Navy's ship-procurement account; procuring a few LCSs and then evaluating them before deciding whether to put the LCS into larger-scale series production; procuring LCSs at a rate of up to 10 per year; procuring LCSs at a rate of less than 5 per year; terminating the LCS program and instead procuring a new-design frigate; and terminating the LCS program and investing more in other littoral-warfare improvements. Fri, 11 Apr 2008 04:00:00 GMT http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL32109